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The Hatch-Waxman Act encourages generic drug companies to submit
an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) for a generic version of a
drug approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).
Nevertheless, a mechanism exists for a brand-name drug company to
adjudicate a patent infringement dispute before the FDA approves an
ANDA. The mechanism includes the regulatory scheme of patent
information submission implemented by the FDA. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)
requires that patent information be correct. False patent information
destroys the objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act. In re Actos End-Payor
Antitrust Litigation, 848 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2017), may demonstrate a new
form of false patent information, because the defendant there mislabeled the
disputed patents as drug product patents rather than method-of-use patents.
The mislabeling caused one generic drug company not to use a Section viii
statement to speed up approval of its ANDA. As a result of the mislabeling,
the marketing of generic drugs was delayed, and patients were forced to
pay monopoly prices for their drugs. This Article argues that such
mislabeling violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which criminalizes
monopolization achieved through anticompetitive conduct.
INTRODUCTION
Section 2 of the Sherman Act (“Section 2”) provides that “[e]very
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony[.]”1 In the pharmaceutical industry, a brand-
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1. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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name drug company2 may violate Section 2 by simultaneously
“withdrawing a successful drug from the market and introducing a
reformulated version of that drug, which has the dual effect of forcing
patients to switch to the new version and impeding generic competition,
without a legitimate business justification[.]”3 This violation, also known as
“product hopping,” has been recognized as a violation of Section 2 by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit since 2015.4
“Product hopping” may occur when a generic-drug company files an
abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) for approval of its generic
drug.5
The Second Circuit may have created another Section 2 violation in the
context of ANDA filing in In re Actos End-Payor Antitrust Litigation6
(“Actos II”) in 2017.7 Pursuant to Actos II, a brand-name drug company
may be held accountable for unlawful monopolization of the market for the
approved drug or an attempt to monopolize such market, because it has
submitted false patent information with respect to its new drug application
(“NDA”).8
The Hatch-Waxman Act (the “Act”) created the ANDA to encourage
generic drug companies to create a generic version of an approved drug and
to make it available in the market at a lower price.9 In order to get approval
from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), an ANDA applicant
must only show that its generic drug “has the same active ingredients as,
and is biologically equivalent to, the [originally-approved drug or] brand-
name drug.”10 The Act also provided a mechanism for a brand-name drug
company to adjudicate a patent infringement issue before an ANDA is
2. A “brand-name drug company” is a company which develops a drug that has never been
invented or used to treat a certain disease. See Jennifer E. Sturiale, Hatch-Waxman Patent
Litigation and Inter Partes Review: A New Sort of Competition, 69 ALA. L. REV. 59, 76 (2017)
(discussing risks of new drug development).
3. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 659 (2d Cir. 2015).
4. See Benjamin M. Miller, Product Hopping: Monopolization or Innovation?, 22 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 89, 91 (2016); but see Gregory Day, Innovative Antitrust and the Patent System,
96 NEB. L. REV. 829, 856 (2018) (discussing the Third Circuit case Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner
Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016) as an opposite view to the Second Circuit).
5. See Alexis S. White, Note, Is “Product Hopping” Anti-Competitive or Fair Game?: A
Look at the Second and Third Circuit Divisions in Actavis PLC and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, 10
BIOTECHNOLOGY& PHARM. L. REV. 39, 39–40 (2017).
6. See generally In re Actos End-Payor Antitrust Litig. (Actos II), 848 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2017)
(vacating the district court decision which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, because the
plaintiff plausibly alleged that but for the false patent information submitted by the brand-name
drug company, the entry of the generic drug would not have been delayed).
7. See Steve D. Shadowen, Causation Principles in Pharmaceutical Antitrust Litigation, 27
COMPETITION: J. ANTI., UCL & PRIVACY SEC. CAL. L. ASSOC. 29, 35 (2018).
8. See Actos II, 848 F.3d at 100–01.
9. See Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (describing the
background of the Hatch-Waxman Act).
10. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 566 U.S. 399, 405 (2012).
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approved by the FDA.11 The mechanism included the regulatory scheme
implemented by the FDA to manage patent information submission.12
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) requires that an NDA include “the patent number
and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which the
applicant submitted the application or which claims a method of using such
drug,”13 where “a claim of patent infringement [of such patent] could
reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”14 The duty to submit patent
information extends to a supplementary application filed by an NDA holder
who wants to add or change the dosage form or route of administration, to
add or change the strength, or to change the drug product from prescription
use to over-the-counter use.15
The FDA categorizes NDA-related patents into drug substance (active
ingredient) patents, drug product (formulation and composition) patents,
and method-of-use patents.16 Patent information must be submitted within
thirty days after the date of approval of an NDA, or for a patent issued after
the approval of the NDA, within thirty days of the date of the patent
issuance.17 If the submitted patent information fulfills regulatory
requirements, the FDA will list such patents in the Approved Drug Products
With Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (also known as the “Orange
Book”).18 The FDA will not, however, review accuracy of submitted patent
information.19
An ANDA must address the patent information of an approved new
drug in two routes.20 In the first route, under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii),
for each listed patent concerning the approved new drug, an ANDA
applicant must certify “(I) that such patent information has not been filed,
(II) that such patent has expired, (III) of the date on which such patent will
expire, or (IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed[.]”21 When
a listed patent is alleged to be invalid or not infringed (also called a
“Paragraph IV certification”), a Paragraph IV ANDA applicant must notify
both the patentee and NDA holder of such Paragraph IV certification with a
11. See Jacob S. Wharton, “Orange Book” Listing of Patents Under the Hatch-Waxman Act,
47 ST. LOUISU. L.J. 1027, 1030–31 (2003).
12. See id.
13. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012).
14. Id.; see also Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 566 U.S. at 405.
15. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.53(d)(2)(i)–(ii) (2019).
16. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1) (2019).
17. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c)(2)(ii) (2019).
18. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
19. See Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman
Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD&DRUG L.J. 417, 428 (2011).
20. See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 566 U.S. 399, 406–08 (2012).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012); see also Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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detailed opinion including factual and legal grounds for the asserted
invalidity or non-infringement.22
Although 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) precludes a finding of patent
infringement “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products,”23 §
271(e)(2) treats an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification as an act of
infringement.24 If the owner of any patent required by 21 U.S.C. §
355(b)(1) files a lawsuit for patent infringement against a Paragraph IV
ANDA applicant within forty-five days after the date on which the
Paragraph IV notice was received, the FDA will approve such an ANDA
“upon the expiration of [a] thirty-month period beginning on the date of the
receipt of the notice”25 or on a date the court may order.26
A Paragraph IV ANDA may become effective immediately, if no
legitimate lawsuit has been filed during the designated period.27 Otherwise,
before the expiration of the thirty-month period, such ANDA will become
effective only on the date of the court’s judgment on invalidity or non-
infringement or on the date of a settlement order or consent decree signed
and entered by the court on invalidity or non-infringement.28 To encourage
generic drug companies to take a risk, the first ANDA applicant with a
Paragraph IV certification will enjoy a 180-day exclusivity of sharing the
drug market with the original NDA holder without any new generic
entries.29
In the second route, an ANDA applicant may file “a statement under 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) averring that the ANDA excludes all uses
claimed in the patent (“Section viii statement”).”30 An ANDA applicant
with a Section viii statement is not subject to the notice duty imposed on a
Paragraph IV ANDA applicant, and no patent lawsuit will be triggered.31
So, the FDA may approve a Section viii ANDA without waiting for a
22. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (2012); see also Apotex, Inc., 347 F.3d at 1338–39.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2018).
24. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
26. Id.; see also Eli Lilly & Co., 496 U.S. at 677–78.
27. See Eli Lilly & Co., 496 U.S. at 677.
28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); see also Ping-Hsun Chen, Destroying A Pharmaceutical
Patent for Saving Lives?: A Case Study of Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 125, 141 (2011).
30. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. Apotex Corp., 669 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(viii); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 566 U.S. 399, 406 (2012) (“A
section viii statement is typically used when the brand’s patent on the drug compound has expired
and the brand holds patents on only some approved methods of using the drug.”).
31. See Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 354 F.3d 877, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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thirty-month period.32 Additionally, there is no delay in generic drug
marketing for an ANDA with a Section viii statement.33
Whether patent information required under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) has
been correctly submitted is crucial for facilitating the functions of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. An ANDA applicant is not allowed to make both a
Paragraph IV certification and Section viii statement,34 except in rare
circumstances.35 If a submitted patent should otherwise be labeled as a
method-of-use patent, an ANDA applicant will be forced to file a Paragraph
IV certification rather than a Section viii statement, which may delay
marketing of the generic drug if the patentee sues such ANDA applicant for
patent infringement.
Before the enactment of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”), some brand-name drug
companies misused the patent information submission process to delay
FDA’s review of a ANDA.36 For example, in In re Buspirone Patent
Litigation, the defendant, a brand-name drug company, earned an additional
30-month stay of FDA’s review of the first ANDA by submitting to the
FDA the disputed patent allegedly misrepresented as covering uses of the
approved drug, such that the defendant allegedly violated Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.37 But, the MMA has clarified what types of patents cannot be
submitted as the required patent information.38 Currently, information
32. See id.
33. See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 566 U.S. at 406.
34. See Purepac Pharm. Co., 354 F.3d at 880 (“The FDA has long required that for every
patent ANDA applicants use either a paragraph IV certification or a section viii statement—they
may not use both.”).
35. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY-180-DAY
EXCLUSIVITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Draft Guidance) 7 (Jan. 2017), available at
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/U
CM536725.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2018) (“FDA has determined that when both drug product or
drug substance claims and method-of-use claims are contained within the same patent, an
applicant may file a paragraph IV certification with respect to the drug product or drug substance
patent claim(s) and a section viii statement with respect to the method-of-use claim(s) in the
patent. This type of certification is commonly referred to as a split certification.”); see also
Watson Labs., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-1344, 2012 WL 6968224, at *4 n.3 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2012).
36. See Kelly, supra note 19, at 428–30 (describing some previous patent-listing problems that
caused multiple thirty-month stays).
37. In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 365–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
38. See Esther H. Steinhauer, Is Noerr-Pennington Immunity Still A Viable Defense Against
Antitrust Claims Arising from Hatch-Waxman Litigation?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 679, 696–97
(2006) (describing Orange Book patent listing requirements under the MMA); see also MMA §
1111(b)(2)(D), Pub. L. 108–173, 117 stat. 2066, 2456 (2003) (codified as 21 U.S.C. §
355(c)(3)(D)(ii)(I) (2018)) (“If an owner of the patent or the holder of the approved application
under subsection (b) of this section for the drug that is claimed by the patent or a use of which is
claimed by the patent brings a patent infringement action against the applicant, the applicant may
assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the holder to correct or delete the patent
information submitted by the holder under subsection (b) of this section or this subsection on the
ground that the patent does not claim either— (aa) the drug for which the application was
approved; or (bb) an approved method of using the drug.” (emphasis added)).
400 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 13
concerning process patents, patents claiming packaging, patents claiming
metabolites, and patents claiming intermediates cannot be submitted to the
FDA.39
While an NDA holder can no longer submit patents that do not cover
uses of the approved drug, Actos II may demonstrate a new form of false
patent information because the Actos II defendant mislabeled the disputed
patents as drug product patents rather than method-of-use patents. This
Article will explore whether mislabeling a patent submitted to the FDA may
cause an NDA holder to violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Part II
analyzes the Actos II decision. Part III addresses why the descriptive
information concerning the disputed patents in Actos II submitted to the
FDA as the required patent information is false. Part IV discusses why
mislabeling of a submitted patent may violate Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. Part IV also discusses how statute of limitations should be evaluated in
criminal enforcement.40
I. ANALYSIS OF IN RE ACTOS END-PAYOR ANTITRUST
LITIGATION
A. BACKGROUND
A patient with diabetes cannot regulate the blood sugar levels inside his
body.41 The irregularity is typically caused by a lack of insulin, a hormone
produced in the pancreas.42 Humans need insulin to make blood sugar enter
cells which is converted into energy.43
There are two types of diabetes: Type 1 and Type 2.44 A patient with
Type 1 diabetes has a pancreas that fails to produce insulin, so he must
acquire insulin from an outside source regularly.45 On the other hand, the
pancreas of a patient with Type 2 diabetes can produce insulin, but the
patient’s body cannot use the insulin effectively.46 That is, the insulin
cannot help blood sugar enter into cells, so the body cannot gain energy
from its main source generated from blood sugar.47 Type 2 diabetes is more
common than Type 1 diabetes in those diabetes patients.48
39. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1).
40. But see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER FOR FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL 4 (Apr. 2005), available at https://www.justice.gov
/atr/file/761666/download (last visited Aug. 29, 2018) (stating that the Department of Justice
usually does not prosecute Section 2 violations criminally).
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ACTOS developed by Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd. and Takeda
Pharmaceuticals North America, Inc. (collectively, “Takeda”) is a drug used
for treating Type 2 diabetes.49 ACTOS is the brand name, while
pioglitazone hydrochloride (also known as “pioglitazone”) is the generic
name of ACTOS.50 Takeda filed an NDA for ACTOS on January 15,
1999.51 The FDA approved the NDA on July 15, 1999.52
The patent information submitted with the ACTOS NDA included U.S
Patent Nos. 4,687,777 (“777 Patent”), 5,965,584 (“584 Patent”) and
6,329,404 (“404 Patent”).53 The 777 Patent covered pioglitazone (5–{4–[2–
(5–ethyl–2–pyridyl)ethoxy]benzyl}–2,4–thiazolidinedione)54 and expired
on January 17, 2011.55 The 777 Patent was listed as a drug substance patent
in the Orange Book.56 On the other hand, the 584 Patent and 404 Patent
covered the combination of pioglitazone with other antidiabetic agents and
methods of using such combination for diabetes treatment,57 and they
expired on June 19, 2016.58 But, Takeda described to the FDA that the 584
Patent and 404 Patent were both drug product patents and method-of-use
patents for ACTOS.59 Thus, the Orange Book listed the 584 Patent and 404
Patent as method-of-use patents.60
On July 15, 2003, four generic drug companies filed ANDAs for
ACTOS individually.61 Regarding the 777 Patent, two companies submitted
a Paragraph IV certification, while the other two submitted a Paragraph III
certification indicating that their ANDAs would not be approved until the
49. Id.
50. See Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 394, 398
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
51. See In re Actos End-Payor Antitrust Litig. (Actos II), 848 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2017).
52. See Watson Pharm., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d at 398.
53. See In re Actos End Payor Antitrust Litig. (Actos I), No. 13-CV-9244 RA, 2015 WL
5610752, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2015). There were other method-of-use patents listed in the
Orange Book and associated with ACTOS. See Watson Labs., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. CIV.A. 12-
1344 ABJ, 2012 WL 6968224, at *7 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2012), vacated, No. 12-5332, 2013 WL
11250319 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 2013).
54. See U.S Patent No. 4,687,777 claim 2; see also Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d at 1353–
54.
55. See Actos I, 2015 WL 5610752, at *4.
56. See Actos II, 848 F.3d at 95.
57. See Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 07 CIV. 3844(DLC), 2007 WL 2936208, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2007).
58. See Actos I, 2015 WL 5610752, at *4.
59. See Actos II, 848 F.3d at 95.
60. See id. at 99. Before August 2003, the Orange Book could list only one description for a
patent. See id. at 98. If an NDA applicant described a submitted patent as claiming both a method
of using a drug and the drug itself, the Orange Book would list the patent as only a method-of-use
patent. See id. at 98–99. The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 corrected that flaw and
provided a counterclaim for a generic drug company in Paragraph IV certification-triggered patent
litigation to delete or correct the patent information in the Orange Book. See Kelly, supra note 19,
at 442; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii).
61. See Actos II, 848 F.3d at 95.
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patent expires.62 Regarding the 584 Patent and 404 Patent, all four
companies submitted a Paragraph IV certification as to the drug product
claims and a Section viii statement as to the method-of-use claims.63
However, the FDA ultimately determined that each of the four companies
must file Paragraph IV certifications for the 777 Patent, 584 Patent, and 404
Patent.64
After the first four ANDAs, several other generic drug companies also
filed ANDAs for ACTOS.65 Among them, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries,
Ltd. and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (collectively, “Teva”) only
submitted a Section viii statement for the 584 Patent and 404 Patent when
filing their ANDA on July 14, 2004.66 Later, on April 14, 2009, Teva filed
an ANDA for ACTOplus Met (“ACTOplus”) that was another drug
developed by Takeda for treating Type 2 diabetes.67 ACTOplus contains
pioglitazone hydrochloride and metformin.68 Takeda’s ACTOplus NDA
was approved in 2005.69 The patent information for ACTOplus included the
584 Patent.70
Takeda sued the first four ACTOS ANDA applicants under 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(2) on October 17, 2003.71 But, in 2010, Takeda settled the lawsuits
with the first four applicants and granted each applicant a nonexclusive
license, such that they could begin to sell generic ACTOS products on
August 17, 2012.72
Teva was initially not subject to a lawsuit under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)
for its ACTOS ANDA.73 But, after filing the ACTOplus ANDA, Teva was
sued for patent infringement by Takeda on May 18, 2009.74 In August 2009,
a citizen petition was filed with the FDA to argue that an ACTOS ANDA
without a Paragraph IV certification for the 584 Patent and 404 Patent
62. See Actos I, 2015 WL 5610752, at *5; see also Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp.,
212 F.3d 1241, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“An ANDA certified under Paragraph III must, even after
meeting all applicable scientific and regulatory requirements, wait for approval until the listed
drug’s patent expires.”).
63. See Actos II, 848 F.3d at 95; see also Actos I, 2015 WL 5610752, at *5; Watson Pharm.,
Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d at 399 (“Because its ANDA seeks FDA approval only for pioglitazone
monotherapy, Watson’s Section viii Statements declare that it is not seeking approval for
Takeda’s patented uses of pioglitazone.”).
64. See Actos I, 2015 WL 5610752, at *5.
65. See Actos II, 848 F.3d at 95; see also Id. at *7.
66. See Actos I, 2015 WL 5610752, at *7.
67. See id. at *8.
68. See id. at *4.
69. See id.
70. See id. (“[T]he 584 patent claims a drug product consisting of pioglitazone hydrochloride
and a biguanide (metformin)[.]”).
71. See id. at *5.
72. See id. at *6.
73. See id. at *7.
74. See id. at *8.
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should not be approved.75 On January 22, 2010, Takeda responded to the
FDA that the 584 Patent and 404 Patent were correctly described as both
drug product patents and method-of-use patents.76 On March 15, 2010, the
FDA granted the citizen petition, stating that an ACTOS ANDA without a
Paragraph IV certification as to the 584 Patent and 404 Patent would not be
considered eligible for completing ANDA submission.77 On March 30,
2010, Teva moved to amend its answer to Takeda’s complaint in the
ACTOplus litigation and challenged Takeda’s incorrect patent descriptions
about the 584 Patent and 404 Patent.78
Finally, Takeda and Teva settled the patent litigation on December 22,
2010. Takeda allowed Teva to sell Takeda-manufactured ACTOS products
on August 17, 2012 and to sell Teva’s own generic drugs 180 days later.79
The plaintiffs in Actos II were patients who took ACTOS or
ACTOplus.80 On December 31, 2013, they sued Takeda, Teva, and the first
ACTOS ANDA applicants for violation of various state antitrust, consumer
protection, and unjust enrichment laws in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York.81 The district court’s jurisdiction
was based solely on diversity jurisdiction for class action under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d).82
On August 22, 2014, plaintiffs filed the third amended complaint.83
Among other things, the complaint based the antitrust claims on the
allegation that Takeda falsely described the 584 Patent and 404 Patent as
drug product patents covering ACTOS, such that the entry of generic
ACTOS was delayed and, therefore, the plaintiffs were forced to pay
monopoly prices after the 777 Patent expired.84
The defendants moved to dismiss the third amended complaint for
failure to state a claim and on standing grounds.85 The district court granted
the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice.86 Then, the plaintiffs
appealed the district court’s decision to the Second Circuit.87 But, the only
issue on appeal involved the allegations concerning monopolization or
attempted monopolization of the ACTOS market.88 Finally, the Second
75. See In re Actos End-Payor Antitrust Litig. (Actos II), 848 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2017).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 97; see also Actos I, 2015 WL 5610752, at *8.
79. See Actos II, 848 F.3d at 97; see also Actos I, 2015 WL 5610752, at *8.
80. See Actos I, 2015 WL 5610752, at *9.
81. See Actos II, 848 F.3d at 97.
82. See id. at 97 n.7.
83. See id. at 97.
84. See id.
85. See Actos I, 2015 WL 5610752, at *1.
86. See id. at *29.
87. See Actos II, 848 F.3d at 93.
88. See id. at 97.
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Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo89 and affirmed it in
part and vacated it in part.90 The case was remanded for further
proceedings.91
B. GOVERNING LAWS
The Second Circuit’s review for a motion to dismiss rested on two
bodies of law.92 First, the standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss
followed Ashcroft v. Iqbal93 which requires that a complaint “contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face[, so as to allow] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”94
Accordingly, at this stage of the proceedings, the plaintiffs’ allegations
were presumed to be true.95
Second, the antitrust claims in Actos II were based on various state
antitrust laws rather than the Sherman Act.96 But, the Second Circuit
considered those state antitrust laws analogous to Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.97 Because the parties did not dispute that the legal standards under the
Sherman Act apply to the issues raised on the appeal, the Second Circuit
relied on cases arising from Section 4 of the Clayton Act to establish the
legal standard for substantive law issues.98
Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes a cause of action to a private
party “who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws[.]”99 An antitrust plaintiff must
establish standing to claim damages from an antitrust defendant.100
89. See id. (citing Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2015)).
90. See id. at 102.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 97–98.
93. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
94. Actos II, 848 F.3d at 97 (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
95. See id. at 98.
96. See id. at 97; see also Picone v. Shire PLC, No. 16-CV-12396-ADB, 2017 WL 4873506, at
*4 (D. Mass. Oct. 20, 2017) (“Under federal law, indirect purchasers cannot bring antitrust claims
for damages under the Sherman Act. … Following [Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977)], various states passed legislation granting indirect purchasers standing to sue under state
antitrust laws.”).
97. See Actos II, 848 F.3d at 97.
98. See id. at 97–98 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100
(1969); Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1986); In re DDAVP Direct
Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Publ’n Paper Antitrust Litig., 690
F.3d 51, 66 (2d Cir. 2012)).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012); see also Publ’n Paper, 690 F.3d at 62.
100. See Jerry L. Beane, Antitrust, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 273, 279–82 (1997) (discussing the
standing requirements under Section 4 of the Clayton Act).
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The Second Circuit focused on the issue of causation in fact.101 The
plaintiffs were required to “show that a defendant’s anticompetitive act was
a ‘material’ and ‘but-for’ cause of plaintiff’s injury, although not
necessarily the sole cause.”102 However, they were not required to “exhaust
all possible alternative sources of injury[.]”103 In Actos II, the alleged
anticompetitive act was Takeda’s misrepresentation of the 584 Patent and
404 Patent as drug product patents,104 and the alleged antitrust injury was
the delay of marketing of generic versions of ACTOS.105
C. SECONDCIRCUIT’SHOLDING
The plaintiffs provided two causation theories concerning why generic
drug companies would not have entered the generic ACTOS market when
the 777 Patent expired.106 Both theories were based on Takeda’s false
descriptions of the 584 Patent and 404 Patent.107 The Second Circuit
assumed this common basis was true for purposes of reviewing the
appeal.108
The first theory rested specifically on the generic drug companies’
knowledge of Takeda’s false patent descriptions.109 According to the
plaintiffs, because of the false descriptions, the first four ANDA applicants
for ACTOS were forced to submit a Paragraph IV certification.110 Then, a
180-day exclusivity period was triggered to prevent other subsequent
ANDA applicants from entering the generic ACTOS market as early as the
first four ANDA applicants would have done.111 After the ANDA-related
patent lawsuits commenced, Takeda settled with the first four ANDA
applicants to allow them to enter the generic market only on or after August
17, 2012.112 Therefore, but for the false descriptions, the Paragraph IV route
would not have happened, and the plaintiffs would have been able to
purchase the generic versions of ACTOS as early as January 17, 2011, the
expiration date of the 777 Patent.113
The Second Circuit found the first theory implausible because the
plaintiffs failed to allege in their complaints that when the first four ANDAs
were filed in 2003 and 2004, the applicants had known that Takeda falsely
101. See Actos II, 848 F.3d at 97 (citing Argus Inc., 801 F.2d at 41).
102. Id. (citing Publ’n Paper, 690 F.3d at 65–66).
103. Id. at 97–98 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 114 n.9).
104. See id. at 98–101.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 98.
107. See id. at 98–99.
108. See id. at 98.
109. See Id. at 98–99.
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described the 584 Patent and 404 Patent.114 Without such knowledge, the
alleged causation was broken because the applicants might believe that the
Hatch-Waxman Act required them to submit the Paragraph IV certifications
rather than the false patent description forced them to do so.115
The second theory specifically addressed Teva’s ANDA.116 According
to the plaintiffs, Teva originally filed Section viii statements as to the 584
Patent and 404 Patent when its ACTOS ANDA was filed.117 The FDA
issued a tentative approval of Teva’s ANDA in 2006.118 But, because of
Takeda’s false descriptions of the 584 Patent and 404 Patent as drug
product patents in response to the citizen petition, the FDA accepted
Takeda’s response and required Teva to file Paragraph IV certifications
instead.119 Then, Teva went from not being subject to the 180-day
exclusivity period to being prevented from entering the generic ACTOS
market during such period.120 Therefore, but for Takeda’s false patent
descriptions, Teva would have received the FDA’s approval to enter the
market of generic ACTOS for non-patented uses as soon as the 777 Patent
expired on January 17, 2011.121
The Second Circuit found plaintiffs’ second theory highly plausible,
because the theory was not premised on “Teva’s knowledge of Takeda’s
description of its patents as drug product patents.”122 The FDA revoked its
tentative approval of Teva’s ANDA and required Teva to submit Paragraph
IV certifications for both the 584 Patent and the 404 Patent.123 The FDA
based its decision solely on Takeda’s descriptions of the 584 Patent and 404
Patent as drug product patents,124 because “the FDA made no attempt to
evaluate whether the descriptions were true, but simply accepted them at
face value.”125 Although Teva later challenged the truthfulness of Takeda’s
descriptions in the ACTOplus litigation, it eventually settled with Takeda
because “the damage[s] had been done.”126
The Second Circuit did not consider whether the settlement between
Teva and Takeda foreclosed the second theory.127 Otherwise, as the court
cautioned, “[a] plaintiff could hardly ask for a clearer causal connection.”128
114. See id. at 98–99.
115. See id. at 98.
116. See id. at 99–100.
117. See id. at 99.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 100.
120. See id.






127. See id. at 100.
128. Id.
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In addition, the court rejected Takeda’s argument that the plaintiffs failed to
cut off other possible causes of Teva’s delayed entry into the generic
ACTOS market.129 While Takeda offered several causation theories,130 the
court criticized that “[i]t is Takeda, however, that is here engaging in gross
speculation.”131 The court further held that some other causes may
supersede the second theory but “do not mandate dismissing the complaint
now.”132
D. DISTRICTCOURT’SDECISION FOLLOWINGACTOS II
After the case was remanded, the plaintiffs moved for leave to amend
the complaint and dropped the claims dismissed by the district court and
Second Circuit.133 The proposed amended complaint expanded the second
causation theory affirmed by the Second Circuit to generic drug companies
other than Teva.134 The district court granted the plaintiffs’ amendments “to
the extent they allege that Takeda’s misrepresentations caused the FDA’s
[2010] ruling [on the August 2009 citizen petition] and that the FDA’s
ruling in turn caused a delay in the generics’ entry[,]”135 because the
allegations were within the scope of the Second Circuit’s remand.136
The district court also found the proposed amendments applicable to
non-Teva generic drug companies.137 Although those non-Teva ANDA
applicants were not parties targeted by the August 2009 citizen petition,138
the district court held that “the FDA’s [2010] ruling was a matter of public
record which the generics would plausibly have been following with
interest given the ruling’s potential impact on their own lawsuits and entries
into the market.”139 Furthermore, the district court agreed with the
plaintiffs’ proposed allegations that if the FDA had ruled that Takeda
should have not listed the 584 Patent and 404 Patent as drug product patents
rather than method-of-use patents, Teva would have been permitted “to
proceed as it had planned to do, [and] that outcome plausibly would have
led the generics to enter the market sooner[.]”140
129. See id. at 100–01.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 101.
132. Id.
133. See In re Actos End-Payor Antitrust Litig. (Actos III), No. 13-CV-9244 (RA), 2018 WL
840099, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2018).
134. See id. at *5.




139. See id. at *6..
140. Id.
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II. FALSE PATENT INFORMATION IN ACTOS II
A. PATENT INFORMATIONREQUIRED BY THE FDA
The Hatch-Waxman Act originally did not specify which patent should
be submitted for patent-listing purposes.141 In 2003, the FDA finally
implemented regulations to clarify which patent is relevant to an approved
drug.142
Currently, for drug substance patents, the FDA only requires
information about patents claiming “the drug substance that is the subject of
the pending or approved NDA”143 or patents claiming “a drug substance
that is the same as the active ingredient that is the subject of the approved or
pending NDA.”144 If an applicant wants to submit information on patents
claiming “only a polymorph that is the same as the active ingredient
described in the approved or pending NDA,”145 he must file additional
technical data required under 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(2) to prove that “a drug
product containing the polymorph will perform the same as the drug
product described in the NDA.”146 If an applicant submits a product-by-
process patent, the submission must include a statement that the product
claimed is novel.147
For drug product patents, the required information only covers patents
claiming the drug product described in the pending or approved NDA.148 21
C.F.R. § 314.3 defines “drug product” as “a finished dosage form, e.g.,
tablet, capsule, or solution, that contains a drug substance, generally, but
not necessarily, in association with one or more other ingredients.”149 Thus,
such submitted patents must claim a finished dosage form. If a patent
claims both a drug product and a drug substance, an NDA applicant may
choose to submit the required information concerning either the drug
product or drug substance.150
141. See Kelly, supra note 19.
142. See id. at 433.
143. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1) (2019).
144. Id.
145. Id. (emphasis added). A “polymorph” is a crystal structure of a compound. Id. See In re
Depomed Patent Litig., No. CV 13-4507 (CCC-MF), 2016 WL 7163647, at *6–7 (D.N.J. Sept. 30,
2016) (describing the definition of “polymorph” and the measurement for identifying the crystal
structure of a polymorph). For more information on “polymorph,” see generally CTR. FOR DRUG
EVALUATION & RES., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ANDAS: PHARMACEUTICAL SOLID POLYMORPHISM (July 2007),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/DrugsuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/Guidances/ucm072866.pdf.
146. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1).
147. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.53(c)(2)(i)(L) (2019); see also Cadence Pharm., Inc. v. Fresenius
Kabi USA, LLC, No. 13CV139 DMS (MDD), 2013 WL 12075975, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 26,
2013).
148. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1).
149. 21 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2019).
150. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.53(c)(2)(i)(S)(1)–2 (2019).
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For patents related to a method of use, the FDA only requires
information on patents claiming “indications or other conditions of use for
which approval is sought or has been granted in the NDA.”151 The
information must “separately identify each pending or approved method of
use and related patent claim(s).”152 Particularly, for approved NDAs,
applicants must file additional information to “identify with specificity the
section(s) and subsection(s) of the approved labeling that describes the
method(s) of use claimed by the patent submitted.”153 In addition, if an
NDA applicant identifies a submitted patent as a method-of-use patent, the
applicant must provide additional information to show “whether that patent
also claims either the drug substance (active ingredient) or the drug product
(composition/formulation).”154
Finally, the FDA has required an NDA holder to fill out declaration
forms for patent information submission.155 An NDA holder is now subject
to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for submitting false patent
information to the FDA.156 But, Actos II suggests that the criminal liability
does not completely prevent a brand-name drug company from cheating the
FDA. The 584 Patent and 404 Patent do not cover the ACTOS product, but
they were falsely labeled as drug product patents.
B. FALSE PATENT INFORMATION INACTOS II
The 584 Patent has both product claims (claims 1–5, 11, 15) and
method-of-use claims (claims 6–10, 12–14, 16).157 Claim 1 is an
independent claim, while other product claims all depend on claim 1.158
151. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1).
152. Id.
153. Id.; see also Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 405 (2012)
(“[T]he regulations issued under that statute require that, once an NDA is approved, the brand
provide a description of any method-of-use patent it holds.”).
154. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c)(2)(i)(O)(3) (2019).
155. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c)(1) (“We will not accept the patent information unless it is
submitted on the appropriate form, Form FDA 3542 or 3542a.”); see also Natalie M. Derzko, The
Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch-Waxman Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 217-18 (2005).
156. See Jacob S. Wharton, “Orange Book” Listing of Patents Under the Hatch-Waxman Act,
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1027, 1062 (2003); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA Form 3542,
available at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/reportsmanualsforms/forms/ucm048345.pdf
(last visited Aug. 7, 2018) (“Warning: A willfully and knowingly false statement is a criminal
offense under 18 U.S.C. 1001.”); 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive,
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully (1)
falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false
writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or entry; shall be fined under this title . . . .”. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
157. See U.S Patent No. 5,965,584 col.17 l.46–col.20 l.10.
158. See id.
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Claim 1 of the 584 Patent recites “[a] pharmaceutical composition
comprising an insulin sensitivity enhancer [i]n combination with a
biguanide, wherein the insulin sensitivity enhancer is selected from the
group consisting of: (1) 5-(4-(2-(3-ethyl-2-pyridyl)ethoxy)benzyl]-2,4-
thiazolidinedione or its pharmacologically acceptable salt, . . . , (3) 5-(4-(2-
(5-ethyl-2-pyridyl)ethoxy)benzyl)-2,4-thiazolidinedione or its
pharmacologically acceptable salt, . . . , and (10) 5-((4-(2-methyl-2-
pyridylamino)ethoxy)phenyl)-methyl)-2,4-thiazolidinedione or its
pharmacologically acceptable salt.”159 Claim 1 is a Markush-type claim.160
So, claim 1 may be interpreted as a pharmaceutical composition having at
least a biguanide and one of those ten listed insulin sensitivity enhancers
(for example, pioglitazone).161
Similarly, the 404 Patent has both product claims (claims 1–12) and
method-of-use claims (claims 13–25).162 Claim 1 is an independent claim,
while other product claims are dependent claims.163
Claim 1 of the 404 Patent recites “[a] pharmaceutical composition
comprising an insulin sensitivity enhancer [i]n combination with an insulin
secretion enhancer, wherein the insulin sensitivity enhancer is selected
from the group consisting of: (1) 5-(4-(2-(3-ethyl-2-pyridyl)ethoxy)benzyl)-
2,4-thiazolidinedione or its pharmacologically acceptable salt, . . . (3) 5-(4-
(2-(5-ethyl-2-pyridyl)ethoxy)benzyl)-2,4-thiazolidinedione or its
pharmacologically acceptable salt, and (4) 5-(4-(2-(6-ethyl-2-
pyridyl)ethoxy)benzyl)-2,4-thiazolidinedione or its pharmacologically
acceptable salt.”164 Again, claim 1 is a Markush-type claim. Claim 1 may be
interpreted as a pharmaceutical composition having at least an insulin
secretion enhancer and one of those four listed insulin sensitivity enhancers
(for instance, pioglitazone).165
159. U.S. Patent No. 5,965,584 claim 1 (emphasis added).
160. See Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prod., Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“A
Markush group is a listing of specified alternatives of a group in a patent claim, typically
expressed in the form: a member selected from the group consisting of A, B, and C. Therefore, if
wherein R is a material selected from the group consisting of A, B, C and D is a proper limitation
then wherein R is A, B, C or D shall also be considered proper.” (quotation marks omitted)).
161. Claim 4 of the 584 Patent further recites “wherein the insulin sensitivity enhancer is
pioglitazone or its hydrochloride and the biguanide is metformin.” U.S Patent No. 5,965,584 claim
4; see also Sam F. Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem: Intellectual Property Incentives,
Market Exclusivity, and the Future of “New” Medicines, 20 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1, 45 (2018)
(“Metformin (dimethyl biguanide) is one of three biguanides originally derived from the French
lilac.”).
162. See U.S. Patent No. 6,329,404 col.17 l.56–col.20 l.18.
163. See id.
164. U.S Patent No. 6,329,404 claim 1 (emphasis added).
165. Claim 2 of the 404 Patent further recites “wherein the insulin sensitivity enhancer is
pioglitazone or its hydrochloride.” U.S Patent No. 6,329,404 claim 2.
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ACTOS does not include a biguanide or insulin secretion enhancer as
an ingredient.166 Therefore, ACTOS is not covered by claim 1 and its
dependent claims of the 584 Patent or 404 Patent.167 The 584 Patent and
404 Patent cannot be labeled as drug product patents for ACTOS.
On the other hand, the 584 Patent and 404 Patent may be labeled as
method-of-use patents for ACTOS. The approved ACTOS labeling
describes the therapeutic effect of ACTOS in combination with metformin
or sulfonylurea.168 In addition, claim 6 of the 584 Patent recites “[a] method
for treating diabetes in a mammal in need thereof, which comprises
administering to such mammal a therapeutically effective amount of an
insulin sensitivity enhancer in combination with a biguanide,”169 while
claim 10, dependent from claim 6, further recites “wherein the insulin
sensitivity enhancer is pioglitazone or its hydrochloride and the biguanide is
metformin.”170 Claim 13 of the 404 Patent recites “[a] method for treating
diabetes in a mammal in need thereof, which comprises administering to
such mammal a therapeutically effective amount of an insulin sensitivity
enhancer in combination with an insulin secretion enhancer, wherein the
insulin sensitivity enhancer is selected from the group consisting of: . . . (3)
5-(4-(2-(5-ethyl-2-pyridyl)ethoxy)benzyl)-2,4-thiazolidinedione or its
pharmacologically acceptable salt,”171 while dependent claim 15 further
recites “[t]he method according to claim 13, wherein the insulin secretion
enhancer is a sulfonylurea.”172
Therefore, Takeda made a false statement concerning the nature of the
584 Patent and 404 Patent when it responded to the citizen petition in 2010.
Takeda, however, has never been charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
It is too late for the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to prosecute Takeda for
166. See In re Actos End Payor Antitrust Litig. (Actos I), No. 13-CV-9244 RA, 2015 WL
5610752, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2015) (“[T]he 584 patent was also listed by Takeda in the
Orange Book for ACTOplus (which contains metformin), and the 404 patent was listed for
Ducetact (which contains an insulin secretion enhancer).”); see also Sandoz, Inc., 2007 WL
2936208, at *4 (“Specifically, Takeda has alleged . . . Moreover, at the time of the filing of its
ANDA, Sandoz manufactured the very products that, when used in combination with pioglitazone,
are covered by Takeda’s patents: Sandoz sells metformin (a biguanide), covered by the ‘584
Patent, and glimepride (an insulin secretion enhancer), covered by the ‘404 Patent.”).
167. See Cognex Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 550 F. App’x 876, 881 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(“[B]ecause all other asserted claims depend from claim 1, and a dependent claim necessarily
cannot be infringed if the independent claim is not infringed . . . .”) (citation omitted).
168. See TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICALS AMERICA, INC., Labeling of ACTOS, 32–36 (2011),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2011/021073s043s044lbl.pdf (last visited
Aug. 26, 2018).
169. U.S. Patent No. 5,965,584 claim 6.
170. U.S. Patent No. 5,965,584 claim 10 (emphasis added).
171. U.S. Patent No. 6,329,404 claim 13.
172. U.S. Patent No. 6,329,404 claim 15.
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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 because the statute of limitations which is
five years has passed.173
III. VIOLATION OF SECTION TWO OF THE SHERMAN ACT
In addition to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, Actos II may
provide a cause of action for the DOJ to sue a brand-name drug company
for violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act to condemn false patent
information submission.
A. ELEMENTS OF SECTION TWO
There are four major categories of Section 2 cases: actual
monopolization, attempted monopolization, joint monopolization, and
incipient conspiracies to monopolize.174 The scenario of false patent
information submission may fall within actual monopolization or attempted
monopolization, both of which target a single firm.175
“Actual monopolization” has two elements: “(1) the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.”176 On the other hand, “attempted monopolization” requires “(1)
that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with
(2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of
achieving monopoly power.”177
The analysis of monopolization starts with defining the “relevant
market” of the defendant’s product.178 Courts consider “all products
173. See United States v. Grenier, 513 F.3d 632, 636 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The applicable statute of
limitations for prosecutions brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is five years. The statute of
limitations begins to run when a crime is complete, that is, when each element of the crime
charged has occurred.” (internal citations omitted)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2018) (“Except
as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any
offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years
next after such offense shall have been committed.”).
174. See WILLIAM HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 3:2
(Westlaw, Dec. 2017 Update). There are four special forms of monopolizing acts that violate
Section 2: monopoly leveraging, essential facilities monopolization, predatory pricing, and
discount bundling. See id.
175. See id.
176. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., 838 F.3d 421, 433 (3d Cir. 2016); see
also New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 651 (2d Cir. 2015) (“To
establish monopolization in violation of § 2, a plaintiff must prove not only that the defendant
possessed monopoly power in the relevant market, but that it willfully acquired or maintained that
power ‘as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.’”).
177. New York ex rel. Schneiderman, 787 F.3d at 651 (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993)).
178. See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 495–96 (2d Cir. 2004).
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reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes.”179 Courts
may also consider “cognizable submarkets which themselves constitute the
appropriate market for antitrust analysis.”180 The inquiry of “submarket” is
fact intensive and based on “such practical indicia as industry or public
recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product’s
peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct
customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized
vendors.”181
The second key question focuses on “monopoly power” which is
defined as “the power to control prices or exclude competition.”182 To
determine whether a defendant possesses monopoly power, courts may
consider direct “evidence of control over prices or the exclusion of
competition” or draw an inference “from a firm’s large percentage share of
the relevant market.”183 When using evidence related to the defendant’s
high market share, courts further consider “other characteristics of the
market, such as the strength of competition, the probable development of
the industry, the barriers to entry, the nature of the anticompetitive conduct
and the elasticity of consumer demand.”184
The last key question is whether “anticompetitive conduct” is defined
as “conduct without a legitimate business purpose that makes sense only
because it eliminates competition.”185 “Anticompetitive conduct” is a
common element of “actual monopolization” and “attempter
monopolization.”186 Regarding “actual monopolization,” the possession of
monopoly power is illegal only when “it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct.”187 Regarding “attempted monopolization,”
evidence of “anticompetitive conduct” may be used to infer “specific intent
to monopolize.”188 In addition, when “monopoly power” is proved,
“evidence of anticompetitive conduct may also prove a dangerous
probability of success.”189
179. Id. at 496.
180. Id.
181. Id. (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)).
182. Id. at 500 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391
(1956)).
183. Id.
184. Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 501 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation
marks omitted).
185. In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 2014).
186. See W. Concrete Structures Co. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), 760 F.2d 1013, 1017–18 (9th
Cir. 1985) (“Attempt to monopolize and actual monopolization involve, among other things,
intentional predatory or anticompetitive conduct.”).
187. New York ex rel. Schneiderman, 787 F.3d at651..
188. See Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., Div. of/& Am. Home Prod. Corp.,
850 F.2d 904, 915 (2d Cir. 1988).
189. See id.
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A brand-name drug company may possess monopoly power over its
approved new drug if there is no substitutive or generic drug for the
approved new drug.190 A brand-name drug company may hold 100%
market share of its approved new drug, especially when the approved new
drug is protected by valid patents, and the FDA postpones approval of other
generic versions.191 Therefore, the ultimate question surrounding a Section
2 violation is whether a brand-name drug company engages in
anticompetitive conduct.
B. FALSE PATENT INFORMATION SUBMISSION AS
ANTICOMPETITIVECONDUCT
Actos II indicates that submitting false patent information is
anticompetitive conduct. First, the Second Circuit held that “[a]n antitrust
plaintiff must show that a defendant’s anticompetitive act was a ‘material’
and ‘but-for’ cause of plaintiff’s injury, although not necessarily the sole
cause.”192 Second, the Second Circuit affirmed that Takeda’s mislabeling of
the 584 Patent and 404 Patent as drug product patents highly plausibly
causes the plaintiffs’ damages of not being able to take Teva’s generic
ACTOS drugs as early as the 777 Patent expired.193 Therefore, the Second
Circuit suggested that Takeda’s mislabeling of the 584 Patent and 404
Patent was actually anticompetitive conduct.
Takeda provided alternative causes of delay for Teva’s generic ACTOS
drugs.194 First, Takeda alleged that Teva’s voluntary settlement with Takeda
was conditioned on Teva’s staying out of the market until August 2012.195
Second, Takeda’s own citizen petition to the FDA lawfully delayed Teva’s
ANDA approval.196 Last, the FDA did not grant Teva’s ANDA until
2014.197
The Second Circuit considered these alternative causes as possible
“barriers to plaintiffs’ causation theory at later stages of the litigation.”198
However, the court also stated that “even at summary judgment, an antitrust
plaintiff may be entitled to a presumption of causation where the
190. But cf.Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421, 435–38 (3d Cir.
2016) (finding that the brand-name drug company’s market share in the oral tetracycline market
never exceeded 18%, because of the interchangeability of the brand-name drug, Doryx, with other
oral tetracyclines (including other generic counterparts of Doryx) and the cross-elasticity of
demand between those two).
191. See Raymond J. Prince, Pay-for-Delay: How Brand-Name and Generic Pharmaceutical
Drug Companies Collude and Cost Consumers Billions, 68 S.C. L. REV. 689, 725 (2017).
192. In re Actos End-Payor Antitrust Litig. (Actos II), 848 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 2017).
(emphasis added).
193. See id. at 100.
194. See id. at 100–01.
195. See id. at 100.
196. See id. at 100–01.
197. See id. at 101.
198. Id.
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anticompetitive conduct ‘is deemed wrongful because it is believed
significantly to increase the risk of a particular injury’ and that injury
occurred.”199 Here, the court implied that submitting false patent
information to the FDA is “wrongful.” The implication is reasonable,
because false patent information significantly increases the risk of delayed
launch of generic drugs. As the Actos II case has demonstrated, had Teva
been able to submit a Section viii statement, Teva’s generic ACTOS would
have entered the market as soon as the 777 Patent expired.
C. ENFORCEMENT AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
After a brand-name drug company receives FDA approval for its NDA,
it enjoys “an exclusivity period, [where] the FDA is barred from approving
a generic ANDA for the NDA product.”200 The FDA grants five-year
exclusivity, also known as new chemical entity (“NCE”) exclusivity, to an
approved drug “that contains no active moiety that has been approved by
[the] FDA under [21 U.S.C. § 355(b)].”201 The FDA reduces the five-year
exclusivity period to four years, if an ANDA applicant submits a Paragraph
IV certification.202 This exclusivity period begins at the time of NDA
approval.203
A brand-name drug company may misrepresent a method-of-use patent
as a drug product patent at the time of approval of its NDA. But, the
anticompetitive conduct delays entry of generic drugs only when a generic
drug company can file an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification at least
four years—likely more than five years—after the approval of an NDA. It
should be noted that a five-year statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. §
3282(a) applies to criminal violations of the Sherman Act.204 Therefore, the
question is whether the DOJ can timely indict such illegal brand-name drug
company. Cases involving violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act may
help clear the air.
199. See id. at 101.
200. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. Food & Drug Admin., 872 F. Supp. 2d 60, 64 (D.D.C. 2012).
201. Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Res., Patents and Exclusivity, FDA/CDER SBIA
CHRONICLES (May 19, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/development
approvalprocess/smallbusinessassistance/ucm447307.pdf; see also Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing
Exclusivity Under United States and European Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 488–89
(2004); Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 98 (2016).
21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) provides that “[a]ctive moiety is the molecule or ion, excluding those
appended portions of the molecule that cause the drug to be an ester, salt (including a salt with
hydrogen or coordination bonds), or other noncovalent derivative (such as a complex, chelate, or
clathrate) of the molecule, responsible for the physiological or pharmacological action of the drug
substance.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1).
202. See Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Res., supra note 201, at 2.
203. See id.
204. See United States v. Evans & Assocs. Const. Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 656, 661 (10th Cir. 1988).
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In United States v. A-A-A Elec. Co.,205 the Fourth Circuit held that “as
long as some action is necessary to achieve a conspiratorial objective, a
conspiracy, under the Sherman Act or otherwise, continues until the offense
has been abandoned or until that objective is accomplished.”206 Thus, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that “the statute of limitations begins to run, not
from the date of the legally cognizable harm, but from the date of the last
overt act.”207
Similarly, when a brand-name drug company mislabels a method-of-use
patent as a drug product patent, this anticompetitive conduct continues until
the patent information is corrected. Without correcting this mislabeling,
possession of unlawful monopoly power remains. Not correcting the false
information also fulfills a brand-name drug company’s objective, because
generic drug companies cannot file an ANDA with a Section viii statement.
Therefore, the statute of limitations should not run from the date of
mislabeling. Rather, it should start to run from the date of correction of such
mislabeling, because a brand-name drug company continues to violate
Section 2 of the Sherman Act until it corrects the mislabeling.
CONCLUSION
When a brand-name drug company submits false patent information to
the FDA, it may commit a federal crime under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. Actos II implies that mislabeling of a method-of-use patent as a drug
product patent is anticompetitive conduct. If a brand-name drug company
possesses monopoly power over its approved drug and commits
anticompetitive conduct simultaneously, it is likely violating Section 2 of
the Sherman Act. This monopolization harms patients’ benefits by not
allowing generic drug companies to use a Section viii statement to speed up
ANDA approval. This unlawfully delays marketing of generics. Patients
then must pay monopoly prices. Therefore, the DOJ is urged to prosecute
Takeda for such Sherman Act Section 2 violation. Otherwise, the objectives
of the Hatch-Waxman Act that encourage generic drugs may be undercut.
205. United States v. A-A-A Elec. Co., Inc., 788 F.2d 242 (4th Cir. 1986).
206. Id. at 245.
207. Id.
